U.S. intelligence agencies have embarked upon a process to develop a
uniform classification policy and a single classification guide that
could be used by the entire U.S. intelligence community, according to a
newly obtained report from the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
The way that intelligence agencies classify information is not only
frustrating to outsiders, as it is intended to be, but it has also
impeded interagency cooperation and degraded agency performance.
In order to promote improved information sharing and intelligence
community integration, the ODNI undertook a review of classification
policies as a prelude towards establishing a new Intelligence Community
Classification Guide that would replace numerous individual agency
classification policy guides.
The initial ODNI review, completed in January 2008, identified
fundamental defects in current intelligence classification policy.
"The definitions of 'national security' and what constitutes
'intelligence' -- and thus what must be classified -- are unclear," the
review team found.
"Many interpretations exist concerning what constitutes harm or the
degree of harm that might result from improper disclosure of the
information, often leading to inconsistent or contradictory guidelines
from different agencies."
"There appears to be no common understanding of classification levels
among the classification guides reviewed by the team, nor any
consistent guidance as to what constitutes 'damage,' 'serious damage,'
or 'exceptionally grave damage' to national security... There is wide
variance in application of classification levels."
Among the recommendations presented in the initial review were that
original classification authorities should specify clearly the basis
for classifying information, e.g. whether the sensitivity derives from
the content of the information, or the source of the information, or
the method by which it is analyzed, the date or location it was
acquired, etc. Current policy requires that the classifier be "able"
to describe the basis for classification but not that he or she in fact
do so.
A copy of the unreleased ODNI report on classification policy was
obtained by Secrecy News.
See "Intelligence Community Classification Guidance: Findings and
Recommendations Report," January 2008:
http://www.gather.com/exchweb/bin/redir.asp?URL=http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/intel/class.pdf
From Secrecy News' perspective, the initial ODNI review falls short in
two respects.
First, it assumes that consistency in classification is intrinsically
desirable and should therefore be imposed by a community-wide
classification guide. But consistency is at most a secondary virtue.
When a classification policy is poorly justified, it is preferable for
it to be inconsistently applied, as in the case of intelligence budget
secrecy (see below).
Second, the review does not touch upon what is probably the single most
necessary change in intelligence classification policy, namely the need
to narrow the definition of intelligence sources and methods that
require protection. Almost anything can serve as an intelligence
source or method, including a subscription to the daily newspaper. But
not every intelligence source or method requires or deserves
classification or other protection from disclosure.
(Note: Sorry about this being so long but this points out why consistency is at most a secondary virtue..)
STATE DEPARTMENT REVEALS 2009 INTELLIGENCE BUDGET REQUEST
The U.S. State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)
is among the most highly regarded members of the U.S. Intelligence
Community. Not coincidentally, it is also among the most open and
accessible.
In particular, it is one of the only Intelligence Community
organizations that regularly publishes its budget. (The FBI also
discloses much of its intelligence spending.)
Thus, the recent 2009 State Department budget justification book
projects a 2009 INR budget of $59.8 million for a staff of 313 persons.
The ten-page 2009 budget justification for INR may be found here:
http://www.gather.com/exchweb/bin/redir.asp?URL=http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/inr/fy2009just.pdf
This would be unremarkable except for the fact that INR's budget
disclosure policy deviates from the norm of U.S. intelligence
classification policy, in which most budget information is
automatically classified. Even some intelligence organizations that
are smaller and less influential than INR insist on classifying their
budgets.
For more than a decade, the Department of Energy Office of Intelligence
published its detailed budget each year. But under pressure from CIA
(so I was told), DOE began withholding its intelligence budget
information in 2004. The last reported figure for DOE intelligence was
$39.8 million in FY 2004 (Secrecy News, 02/07/05).
If consistency in classification policy were to prevail throughout the
U.S. intelligence community, as the Director of National Intelligence
has recommended, then State Department intelligence might be expected
to follow DOE intelligence into pointless, unnecessary secrecy.

