The newest chapter of my book-in-progress on crime and corruption in the Connecticut legal system is titled The Connecticut Wiretap Statutes. The synopsis for this chapter is: The author gets a comprehension of the activities and aims of the criminal state's attorneys from studying the Connecticut statutes on wiretapping. This chapter is also found on my blog henryberryinct.blogspot.com with the twelve previous completed chapters and occasional posts related to the book.
My book-in-progress on crime and corruption in public and private sectors of the Fairfield County, Connecticut, legal system, opens with my becoming suspicious that there is an illegal wiretap on my phone. This latest chapter of my book is a long chapter in which I weigh various parts of the sections on the procedure for obtaining a wiretap, the grounds for it, and the handling of it in the criminal-justice system to understand the crimes being committed by Connecticut state's attorneys and their accomplices and just how I was being targeted for entrapment into committing a crime so they could prosecute me for filing a criminal complaint for theft and cover-up of it against attorneys James T. Shearin and Timothy A. Bishop at the Bridgeport office of the Pullman and Comley law firm.
A few years later I conducted a civil case with the Fairfield County State's Attorney Jonathan Benedict as one of the defendant on the grounds of violations of my constitutional right to privacy and related allegations. Other parts--called counts--of my complaint alleged that Jonathan Benedict knew about the illegal wiretap on my phone and was involved in the cover-up of it.
In accordance with procedures of the civil case, I requested to see documents relating to the wiretap. when Jonathan Benedict refused to hand these over to me in accordance with the rules, I asked the judge to order him to do so. The judge did order him to do so. As part of her ruling, she ruled that if he did not, he would be in default. In a civil case, a default against a defendant means that he has admitted to the allegations against him. Since the allegations in the civil case were virtually the same as would be made in a criminal case for an illegal wiretap (including lying to judges of the panel overseeing wiretap, covering up the wiretap, etc.), Jonathan Benedict was in effect ruled to have admitted to criminal activity.
The last four paragraphs of the new chapter of my book-in-progress follow:
After reading the wiretap statutes and reasoning that the state's attorneys were trying to entrap me for drug crimes, I felt I was in a better position to guard myself against their treachery. I wasn't in the dark any longer. Even if they did manage to get me arrested, I felt, I would be able to defend myself better knowing there were lies about me in the wiretap application and knowing the positions of the individuals in the criminal-justice system who had initiated and organized the scheme against me. I knew their scheme would have to be pulled off perfectly or their criminal acts including perjury in the wiretap application and abuse of office would be exposed. I was encouraged too that my instincts in rejecting the approaches of the women agents were a means of safeguarding myself in the situation. Although I knew there was nothing I could do to protect myself completely against the state forces being used against me if they took certain turns such as a falsified arrest warrant, I felt that now having a clearer understanding of these statutory, institutional, and individual forces, I was in an improved position to contend with them.
My identification of the sources of the threats against me and awareness of the manifestations they would take from studying the wiretap statutes which I felt improved my position in not falling prey to them did not end my feeling of being exceptionally vulnerable and exposed, however. Beyond guiding me to the sources of the threats and helping to recognize manifestations so I could better safeguard myself, studying the wiretap statutes brought on a new, greater level of concern. While the wiretap statutes informed me of particular law-enforcement tools, techniques, and individuals I was facing, beyond this they informed me of the intensity, determination, and duration of the malevolence of the individuals who were orchestrating the entrapment plot against me. For if successful in its highest goals, I would go to jail for years. If the plot fell short of its highest goals, I would still get some lesser sentence for crimes I had been entrapped into committing and likely some I had never even committed and be ever more stigmatized as a criminal. The state's attorney's were trying entrapment scenarios over and over. They were unconscionably abusing a wiretap, recognized by law-enforcement officials, legislators, and the public as an extreme means for dealing with suspected criminals. The criminal core of state's attorneys were knowingly portraying me as a criminal to numbers of their associates.
Considering the level of malevolence toward me by at least a few higher-level individuals in the criminal-justice system, I had no assurance, no expectation that it would stay contained within the system. Abused aspects of law-enforcement retain the appearance or form of the aspects being abused. The abuse of the wiretap procedures had to retain the appearance of legitimacy. Directions given to subordinates for purposes of fulfilling the perverse design of superiors had to appear reasonable and legal. Behavior of agents in an entrapment scenario had to appear normal or at least acceptable according to the circumstances. But I assumed that the state's attorneys had already worked with one or more individuals outside of the criminal-justice system in ways that had nothing to do with the legitimate purposes of law enforcement in getting the lies for the wiretap application. Such individuals--usually known as "informers"--are notorious for doing the biding of prosecutors and others in law-enforcement. Informers are used especially in drug cases. Since the state's attorneys had already gotten some informer to make lies for the wiretap application, what would stop them from getting an informer--the large majority of whom are known to be criminals--to commit other crimes outside the procedures of the criminal-justice system?
The goal of the state's attorneys was not justice, not arrest and sentencing of a suspected criminal, not routine activity in reducing crime. Their goal was drastic, long-lasting harm to me. The first means for this was what was most accessible, familiar, and controllable for them; namely, the state's attorneys' part of the Connecticut criminal justice system. The practiced way they went about abusing this system leaves no doubt they had abused it similarly before. I was able to avoid becoming framed not because of lack of skilled abuse, weakness of intention, or obscurity of goal on their part, but because as a highly-educated, considerably experienced, well-read individual always skeptical about the true intents of individuals upon first meeting them, particularly individuals approaching me in a somewhat confused manner, I had not reacted as they had expected right at the openings of their entrapment scenarios. But I had no illusions or trust that the state's attorneys would be satisfied with keeping within the criminal-justice system in their desire to bring me harm once they saw that their malicious abuses of the system were not working.
In keeping from being entrapped, I was making myself a target for more devious, not so easily recognized, and possibly more harmful scenes and ploys which would not be abuses of aspects of the criminal-justice system, but would be naked, unbridled efforts of the state's attorney's determination to bring me serious harm. Abuses of aspects of the criminal-justice system by employing them in ways they were never meant to be employed would nevertheless inevitably, necessarily retain some elements, appearances, and qualities of the aspects. A fake of something has to reflect that something in some way. With the state's attorneys abandoning aspects of their field which they saw from experience as suitable for entrapping me, I would have no idea of the means or manifestations at work against me. Not rooted in aspects of the criminal-justice system, these would come out of the state's attorneys' imagination fueled by their malevolence. There was no way I would be able to be prepared for every possible effort to bring me harm in a situation that was not in some way reflecting aspects of the criminal-justice system, no matter how pervertedly. I adapted by no longer seeing myself mainly as defending myself against malevolent states' attorneys' willful abuse of aspects of law enforcement, but as a businessperson or traveler advised to follow certain protective measures when in a country where terrorists were active against foreigners because they saw them as alien to their idiosyncratic, obscurantist convictions.
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