US paradox of creation and destruction in Iraq

 "Motor grader operators work with loaded carbines at their sides; ... scrapers cut roads across the shadows of hastily prepared gun emplacements; a lean, tanned construction superintendent waxes enthusiastic over the future while helicopters stutter overhead looking for enemy guerrillas."

This was not from a contemporary journalist's  report on Iraq.  It was written in 1966, describing  the US's massive construction effort  in Vietnam in 1966. The  American project to build a separate nation  in southern  Vietnam engaged academic experts in economics, political science, police systems and government, as well as dozens of private corporations which specialized in engineering and construction.

James M Carter in his article "US paradox of construction and destruction"  offers a comparison between  the US  nation building efforts in Vietnam and Iraq .

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/JD25Ae01.html

Carter writes, "Recent building activity in Iraq has taken place amid growing violence. Contractors operate equipment under the crackle of automatic weapon fire and with the protection of M-1 tanks, Stryker vehicles and Apache helicopters. The workers in this case are constructing a series of walls to block certain areas of Sadr City, the vast Shi'ite slum in Baghdad.

Dozens of walls have already been built around Baghdad, the southern city of Basra and other Iraqi cities, creating segregated ethnic Sunni and Shi'ite neighborhoods ringed with checkpoints and command posts. The latest flurry of construction activity has little to do with nation building, but rather is more related to a deteriorating security environment.

The US is now five long years into what has turned into an enormous nation-building project where success has proven elusive, difficult to measure and subject to frequent sudden reversals."

As the Vietnamese National Liberation Front   insurgency  grew the US  expanded  the military aspect of it's nation building program,  training and equipping the forces of its client regime in Saigon. The first phase focused on establishing  strategic hamlets,  placing people in  heavily guarded encampments walled off from surrounding areas,  along with counterinsurgency tactics against the insurgent resistance.

" As the resistance expanded and the regime in Saigon was plagued by problems of illegitimacy, leadership and corruption, "  writes Carter, "the US administration of Lyndon Johnson responded with a 'surge' of its own. However, the escalation did not initially involve US troops, but rather was led by a consortium of major private construction firms - Raymond Intl, Morrison-Knudsen, Brown & Root, and J A Jones Construction.

Those four firms, though not the only firms working on projects in southern Vietnam, were responsible for building a vast modern military infrastructure designed to make the new country defensible against insurgent forces. The consortium, which dubbed itself The Vietnam Builders, went on to complete a nearly miraculous military construction effort - not to mention a strong fiscal stimulus for the US economy."

The construction included  six major ports , six naval bases, eight jet airstrips, twelve airfields, 20 bases , with  housing for 450,000 servicemen and their families.  This made possible the eventual  deployment of over 540,000 US troops by the end of the decade and the import of over 500,000 tons of supplies to  each month. 

Describing the developments in  Iraq,  Carter  suggests " we are witnessing a sort of replay of Vietnam - although at a dramatically faster speed."  His description of the paradox between the roles of the military  and  the private contractors supports his conclusion :   " Vietnam showed that greater militarization will only bring more destruction, suffering and political polarization and accentuate the paradox of simultaneous construction and destruction, which unfortunately has found painful new life in Iraq."