Opposing a Phased Iraq Withdrawal

Lawrence Korb and Sean Duggan of the Center for American Progress penned a column this past weekend arguing in favor of a phased withdrawal from Iraq with a certain date for its completion. While many have advocated this position before, and its merits and drawbacks have been widely debated, I felt it necessary to address the topic once again.

Korb and Duggan begin their column with the much touted "Iraqis must take control" argument, saying "The United States must seize this opportunity and allow the Iraqis to take control of their own security by beginning a responsible phased withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from Iraq." What they fail to address is this: what if the Iraqis are not yet ready?

By focusing on the long-term goal of Iraqi responsibility, Korb and Duggan, and other notables such as Barack Obama and Joe Biden, ignore the short-term reality of Iraqi capability. Using a withdrawal timetable to force Iraqis to step up to the plate only works if the Iraqis are actually able to assume control from U.S.-led coalition forces. To put Iraqis in harm's way before they are ready is like leading lambs to the slaughter. What do we do if we say we're going to pull out one brigade a month, and while we are executing that plan, chaos erupts and Iraq devolves into a failed state?

Do we stop the withdrawal, based on an assessment of conditions on the ground, or do we continue to stick to our rigid timeline no matter what the consequences are?

Addressing the issue of just how long the withdrawal should take, Korb and Duggan argue that "...a massive yet safe and orderly redeployment of U.S. forces, essential equipment and support personnel is within the capabilities of the U.S. military and could be achieved efficiently and safely over eight to 10 months."

This is pure fantasy. American forces are still the primary providers of security throughout much of Iraq, and a rapid deployment of U.S. troops would expose those remaining, waiting their turn, to greater danger by forcing them to defend more territory with fewer resources, backed by an Iraqi security apparatus that is still being trained and readied for combat.

Korb and Duggan go a step further, saying that if it really needed to, the U.S. military could evacuate Iraq in as little as three months, by conducting an "invasion in reverse." They go on to discount the 90-day timetable, saying it would "...create an instant political and security vacuum...." But what's the real difference between three months and eight to ten months? Is it so significant as to expect Iraqi forces to be that much more capable with the addition of just a few extra months?

Finally, Korb and Duggan conclude by citing three advantages to a phased redeployment of U.S. forces. Each of the three, however, breaks down upon closer examination.

The first advantage, they say, is that "...withdrawal is a conventional operation that plays to the strengths of the U.S. military." While it is true that U.S. forces have doctrinal and logistical provisions for executing a withdrawal operation, Korb and Duggan ignore the fact that this withdrawal would be conducted under fire, putting our soldiers at increased risk while they focused on packing up and heading south. That is, of course, unless we are to believe that our enemies in Iraq will just stop the shootings and the bombings and instead line the roads to wave goodbye.

Second, they argue, there will be no power vacuum in Iraq because a withdrawal will put the Iraqis and neighboring states "...on notice that they-not the United States-will be responsible for the consequences of Iraq's internal stability...." As mentioned above, this line of reasoning assumes that Iraqi forces are fully ready and ignores the lessons learned from recent Iraqi offensives in Basra, Baghdad, and Diyala. While the Iraqis are showing improvement with each passing day, they have a long way to go and will require the assistance of the U.S. military for the foreseeable future.

Finally, Korb and Duggan say a phased withdrawal would actually improve security for American troops because "...it's at least possible that the climate for a withdrawal will be relatively secure...." At least possible? There's an awful lot riding on that assumption, and as we like to say in the military, hope is not a method.

The reality is that American forces need to reduce their presence in Iraq based on the maintenance of security gains made over the past 18 months. Security realities must dictate the pace of withdrawal, something noted by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki who, while calling for a timeline for coalition troop withdrawals, has always caveated his statements by retaining the flexibility to adjust the timeline based on conditions on the ground.