Beethoven Goes South - Identity and Culture in the EU's Mediterranean Policy

The EU’s policy towards the Mediterranean has traditionally been shaped by economic, commercial and security concerns and the impact of member state preferences and powerful interest groups on its course of development and content has been significant. It has evolved from a loose set of bilateral cooperation agreements towards a regional approach defined in the Barcelona Declaration of 1995. The latest stage, however, is the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) which was developed in the context of the 2004 enlargement and its scope was extended from the EU’s eastern neighbors to include the countries of the southern Mediterranean as well. Whereas both the Euro-Med partnership (EMP) and the ENP are to a large extent focused on trade and security matters, they nonetheless have cultural and social dimensions and espouse a vocabulary of shared norms and values. In appreciation of the importance of identity and culture for the contemporary academic debate, it is the aim of this paper to assess their role in the EU’s relations with its Mediterranean partners. In the first section, a brief discussion of some of the theoretical interpretations of identity and culture is provided. In the second section, the differences and similarities between the EMP and the ENP are traced, revealing certain aspects of the two policies that impinge on the theoretical studies of culture and identity. Then, the cultural content of the ENP is presented, and the Action Plan for Morocco is taken as an illustration. Finally, the findings from the development and content of the policies are tied to the specific theoretical insights of the more sociological approaches to the study of European Foreign Policy.         

Culture and Identity in IR and European Foreign Policy Studies

The concepts of ‘culture’ and ‘identity’ have gradually entered the academic debate in International Relations and European Foreign Policy (EFP). Realist and neoliberalist interpretations of the international system as characterized by power politics or strategic bargaining between states have been challenged by more sociologically oriented thinking.    While constructivist approaches share the neorealist and neoliberalist vision of the international system with the state as the primary actor in it, they define its key structures as intersubjective rather than material.[1] As suggested by Alexander Wendt, its cultural structure is defined as ‘a stock of interlocking beliefs, ideas, understandings, perceptions and identities.’[2] John Ruggie emphasizes the combination of ideational and material aspects that constitute international reality, noting their normative and instrumental dimensions, individual and collective intentionality and dependence on temporal and spatial contexts.[3] Yosef Lapid underscores the theoretical value of studying cultures and identities as ‘emergent and constructed,’ ‘contested and polymorphic,’ and ‘interactive and process-like.’[4] These interpretations point to a conception of identity as constructed through interaction and thus inherently changeable, dynamic and adaptable to alterations in the environment in which it is set. There are, however, others who contest this view and instead conceptualize identity as an intrinsic feature of the agent. Brian White discusses the EU as ‘being an international identity,’[5] while realists, as noted by Peter Katzenstein, see culture and identity as endogenous features of states, dependent on the distribution of power, and rationalist interpretations equate the two concepts with the material features of states.[6] Finally, the clear-cut differentiation between rationalist and constructivist logics may be an essentially flawed dichotomy. Constructivist theorists have recognized and studied the fact that interest-based strategies are ‘socially informed by longer-term values’.[7]  

The relevance of culture and identity for Europe’s foreign policy has also been subject to considerable debate. Ulrich Sedelmeier has noted that the great majority of authors treat the EU’s international identity and its ‘international role’ and ‘actorness’ as interchangeable.[8] Thus, the EU has often been described as devoid of material power in terms of military capabilities but in possession of significant  ”soft power” arising from the credibility of its identity as representing a set of distinctive values and norms.[9] This view is taken up and extended by Karen Smith who examines the effects of the EU’s political conditionality in its relations with third countries. She notes that human rights promotion has led to a foreign policy with an ethical dimension, even if the EU has not recognized this as an explicit objective.[10] This, in turn, has had an effect on the Union both domestically, through adding ‘European value’ to member states’ foreign policies, and at the global level, through shaping its ‘international identity’.[11] Franck Petiteville refers to this external dimension of the EU as ‘soft diplomacy’ – the reliance of long-term ‘cultural influence’ instead of short-term diplomatic pressures in order to achieve international political influence.[12] He differentiates this concept from ‘soft imperialism,’ thus asserting the EU’s role in deliberation and articulation of values as opposed to the rigid definition and imposition of certain norms. These interpretations are mostly focused on identity as an external feature of the EU, a set of policies and preferences that are clearly discernible and serve a defining role in its external relations. Taking up a different analytical stance, Ulrich Sedelmeier notes that

…an (international) identity is something that the EU might or might not have, but if it has a particular identity or social role, then this is also an independent variable, rather than (just) the dependent variable.[13]

This is a departure from a conceptualization of identity as subordinate to the actions of states, placing it instead at the causal end of policy making. It is in line with the ‘logic of appropriateness’ argument according to which the behavior of actors is shaped by ‘collectively shared understandings of what constitutes proper behavior in a given rule setting.’[14] The notion has significant explanatory power in terms of the impact of European identity on the policies adopted by member states. The EU’s identity, even if its nature and existence are highly contested, serves as a point of reference and sets certain limits within which actions can be taken.[15]

This view may certainly hold true for member states whose behavior is conditioned by their explicit commitment to a voluminous body of Community law, continuous interaction within the European institutions, and shared legal and political traditions. However, it is the aim of this paper to assess the extent to which the EU’s identity plays a role in its relations with the countries of the southern Mediterranean. After setting the background with a brief description of the Barcelona Process, the discussion follows up the development of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and its continuation in the European Neighborhood Policy.   

The Barcelona Process

The signing of the Barcelona Declaration in November 1995 was met with high levels of optimism, seen as the first step towards a more coherent EU Mediterranean strategy and an opportunity for addressing the region’s pressing challenges. It came as the last step of a continuous and tortuous development of Community policies directed at the Mediterranean, which had started with a broad collection of diverse partnership and association agreements in the 1960s, which were then replaced with ‘Cooperation Agreements’ in the 1970s and the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements of the early 1990s. All of these policies were generally formulated and put into effect by the Community, the rhetoric of partnership coming second to European commercial interests.[16] The Barcelona Declaration, while emerging from these initiatives, is distinct from them on two main counts. First, it combines the existing bilateral approach, based on individual agreements with Mediterranean partner countries, with multilateralism (regional dimension) focused on issues common for the region as a whole. The differentiated nature of bilateralism has not lost its importance in addressing issues that are specific to some of the partner countries. However, the regional dimension has the potential to induce work on challenges that are common for all the states involved. In this regard, the Barcelona Declaration widens the scope of the previously existing partnership by organizing it into three chapters – Political and Security, Economic and Financial, and Social, Cultural and Human Partnership.[17] The first two headings encompass cooperation on a wide array of issues, ranging from the promotion of regional political stability and the non-proliferation of weapons to a commitment to the establishment of a free-trade area by 2010 and support for the economic development of the partner countries. They have been criticized both for their content and implementation, and the main concerns voiced have focused on the asymmetry between the EU and the Mediterranean partner countries in terms of their ability to influence the agenda in economic and political matters.[18]

The Economic and Political chapters are not much different from the previous course of development of the Euro-Med partnership, and the initiatives falling within them are to a large extent shaped by the EU’s interests. The Social, Cultural and Human chapter, however, appears to signal a more profound commitment to the region, aimed at developing a more far-reaching cooperation in a wider set of areas. It envisages the development of human resources, youth exchanges, cooperation in media, education, social development and migration, and, in a more ambitious wording, ‘dialogue between cultures and civilizations.’[19] The importance of dialogue is defined in ideational terms, with references to ‘the traditions of culture and civilization throughout the Mediterranean region’[20] and to ‘bringing peoples closer, promoting understanding between them and improving their perception of each other.’[21] This can be seen as an attempt to conciliate an instrumental interpretation of culture and identity as a means to furthering specific objectives (‘understanding’ and ‘proximity’) with an ex ante assumption treating them as being constructed through interaction and dependent on contexts[22] instead of being endogenous and preceding the interaction.

From EMP to ENP – Common Interests, Shared Values

The ENP is the new framework for the EU’s relations with its neighbors to the east and the south. Its stated aim is to ‘avoid drawing new dividing lines within Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union.’[23] The language surrounding the policy includes both ‘sharing fundamental values and objectives’ and ‘gains in terms of increased stability, security, and well-being.’[24] It is based on a differentiated treatment of partner countries, with the drawing up of detailed Action Plans listing specific priorities for each of the partner countries, and the ‘level of ambition’ in the EU’s  relationship with each of them will ‘take into account the extent to which these values are effectively shared.’[25] The Commission has stated that the ENP will supplement existing regional and sub-regional agreements, developing ‘further regional cooperation and building on the achievements of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.’[26] Therefore, the two approaches are meant to complement each other. However, there are a number of differences that reflect the EU’s internal dynamics[27] and especially the role of enlargement and the growing awareness of security concerns emerging from the neighborhood. Apart from mere technicalities, they may be seen as important for the content of the partnership and the extent to which it may or may not evolve into a platform for socialization, with a long-term convergence of values, as opposed to a fleeting adjustment of behavior in the expectation of immediate rewards. The main differences between the two policies, namely the shift in the perception of ‘region’ and the emphasis on ‘joint ownership’ are discussed here with a consideration of their relevance for the concept of identity. Then, the cultural dimension of the ENP and its relationship to the existing programs within the EMP is reviewed.

A crucial distinction between the two policies is the conceptualization of ‘region.’ As discussed by Federica Bicchi, following the initial period of bilateralism, the Community got involved in ‘inventing the Mediterranean’ and formulated a global policy towards the countries that fall within the distinct entity.[28] By ‘building’ a region, the EU goes beyond treating an area as a mere geographical entity and structures its relations on the basis of well-defined and legally binding agreements. These relations, however, can take different forms. The influence of the EU has been interpreted as hegemonic, incorporating the Mediterranean into the European region and subsuming distinct local preferences and interests into patterns of behavior imposed from above.[29] Therefore, adaptation in the partner countries comes as the result of deliberate strategies on the part of the EU, backed by substantial rewards and threats. Evidence in support of this view is mostly grounded in the economic partnership under the Barcelona Process which has been criticized for its asymmetric nature and non-cooperative behavior on the part of the EU. Conversely, an emphasis on socialization would describe the regional partnership as one based on symmetric relations, cooperation and dialogue between partners. In this sense, hegemony would take a positive connotation as the experience and resources at the EU’s disposal which can serve as an incitement and a support mechanism for the reforms of Mediterranean partners.[30] Therefore, the region, in its EU meaning as an entity defined by legally and politically binding commitments, provides the venue in which social interaction takes place.

The ENP practically broadens the concept of ‘region’ and dilutes its meaning by including the EU’s eastern and southern neighbors in the same policy framework. This can challenge its success in cooperating with the partner countries as there would be significant differences between the interests and priorities of member states belonging to two separate geopolitical localities. However, the emphasis on ‘shared values and objectives’[31] may be taken to mean that a degree of ‘commonness’ will ensue from a focus on the lasting priorities of ‘rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights, promotion of good neighborly relations and the principles of human rights and sustainable development.’[32] Thus, the differences between the regions may be transcended through reference to standing values that are of fundamental importance to the partner countries regardless of their particular geographical location, or cultural, linguistic, or religious particularities. Moreover, the ‘differentiation’ approach of the ENP, based on individual Action Plans tailored at the specific needs of each country,[33] to an extent eliminates the problems of regional differentiation altogether. It is based on common values and general priorities, but the specific steps to be taken are geared at the individual situation of each partner state. Finally, the extended geographical scope of the ENP may also serve to uncover the fact that there are considerable inter- and intra-state differences among the countries of the southern Mediterranean, which the treatment of the region as a homogeneous whole may disregard. Hence, as the nature of the ENP downplays the concept of ‘region’, it places a different emphasis on identity. The commonness is thus no longer based on a shared past and traditions but rather on ‘shared values’ in the present.[34]

The problem of defining the region and its precise boundaries has been a salient feature of the European Mediterranean policy. As discussed above, the conceptualization of the Mediterranean has gone beyond geography and culture, entering the realm of legally defined international commitments. The key uncertainty has been whether Europe is developing a policy towards the Mediterranean as a region outside of it, or as an entity that is essentially a part of it.[35] It can be argued that the southern member states have more in common with the countries of North Africa, in terms of a long history of interaction and current ties strengthened by the presence of considerable immigrant communities, than with other countries that are part of the EU. However, they can distinguish themselves by virtue of their belonging to institutionalized Europe. There are numerous factors that divide the northern and southern part of the Mediterranean. The dramatic income gap, exacerbated by the huge discrepancy in population growth rates, constitutes one such difference and represents a crucial cause of ‘soft’ security concerns. However, the north-south distinction is made more acute by what can be interpreted as the artificial construction of difference – membership of the EU not only alters the interests and preferences of actors but also invests them with a sense of being firmly ‘European’. Therefore, even if cultural similarities persist, the line across the Mediterranean is drawn on the basis of ‘European-ness.’

If belonging to Europe is interpreted as being the essence of the North-South difference in the Mediterranean, then this assertion should also be considered in reverse – identity is formed by having a countervailing referent object. The construction of ‘Europe’ has proceeded alongside the parallel construction of ‘others.’[36] Thus, the Mediterranean region, if seen as both being part of the EU’s policy and being a distinct entity, can be conceived as Europe’s ‘other.’ The threat posed by the ‘other’ is articulated by an excessive focus on a plethora of security concerns associated with North Africa. This is reflected in the EU’s discourse on the EMP which reflects the two contradictory concepts of the Mediterranean as either a ‘shared civilizational identity’ or as a ‘conflict-ridden zone.’[37] Europe’s identity is therefore either defined on the basis of similarity with the first variant or in sharp contrast with the second. While cooperation in ‘low politics’ issues of culture and education point to the ‘shared identity’ concept, the focus on managing security threats through political and economic cooperation reflects apprehensions about the Mediterranean as a source of instability. 

The duality between the ‘social, cultural and human partnership’ and the ‘zone of peace, stability and prosperity’[38] is reflected in both the EMP and the ENP. The potential tension between the two priorities, reflected in the differentiation between the two visions of the Mediterranean, does not negate the possible linkages between social and cultural development and stability. Indeed, the Commission has been involved in policy entrepreneurship underscoring the Union’s ‘soft’ power whose greatest strength lies in cooperation on issues of low politics. Thus, the Work Program for the EMP defines three key priorities for the next five years – Human Rights and Democracy, Sustainable Growth and Reform, and Education.[39] The emphasis is on ‘partnership on the basis of joint ownership, dialogue and cooperation.’[40] Funds for basic, secondary and higher education have so far been channeled through the MEDA program, and the Commission has stressed that the aim of the Union is not only to finance the efforts of partner countries in the field but also to share its experience in the sector.[41] There is also a specific reference to ‘fostering the emergence of a Euro-Mediterranean cultural identity’ as the objective of the Euro-Med Audiovisual program which was initiated in the year 2000.[42]

Identity also informs the ‘joint ownership’ approach which is central to the ENP strategy. The emphasis on the ‘clear recognition of mutual interests in addressing a set of priority issues’[43] addresses complaints by Mediterranean partners about the lack of transparency and the insufficient consultation on the distribution of funds within the MEDA program.[44] This approach is at the heart of the ENP which depends on ‘the recognition of mutual interests in addressing a set of priority issues.’[45]  By maintaining the principles of ‘joint ownership’ and dialogue with partner countries, the EU dampens the effects of the self-other differentiation and purports to express a commitment to a common definition of values, interests and priorities. However, the interests and values are specifically defined by the EU and it then takes their ‘commonness’ for granted. The norm diffusion strategy of the ENP mirrors the enlargement process with its reliance on pre-defined criteria for convergence, elaboration of lists of progress indicators (benchmarking) and comprehensive monitoring and regular evaluation of the achievements of each partner country. This can be attributed to the institutional bias of DG Enlargement, initially in charge of drafting and implementing the policy which was later transferred within the competences of DG External Relations.[46] 

As noted by some of the sociology-oriented approaches to IR, which were briefly discussed at the beginning of this paper, identity can be more accurately characterized as dynamic and emerging from interaction rather than as a fixed attribute of unitary actors.[47] This view is developed by Thomas Risse’s ‘logic of arguing’ which sees the adoption of a norm-guided behavior as the outcome of a communicative consensus.[48] The participants in a discourse are persuaded by arguments and conformity results from acceptance of their validity rather than from a cost-benefit calculation.[49] Conversely, the concept of ‘rhetorical action’[50] stresses the instrumental use of norms and the justification of self-interested behavior through references to the institutional environment and the norms and collective identity of a particular community.[51] The discourse on the ENP seems to be conformant with the ‘logic of arguing’ assumption as the EU has reiterated the role of dialogue and mutual recognition of interests and priorities together with the partner countries.[52] However, even if specific priorities for action might be defined jointly, the common values on which the extent of the partnership and the ‘ambition and pace of development’[53] will depend are defined by the EU and do not pay heed to cultural differences and particularities.

The diffusion of European norms and values, as grasped by the ‘logic of arguing’ and ‘rhetorical action’ paradigms is conceived as targeting the decision-making elites of the partner countries. However, the cultural aspect of the partnership aims to reach towards the societies of partner countries and ‘connect the peoples of the Union and its neighbors’, ‘enhance mutual understanding’ and ‘eliminate distorted perceptions.’[54] Under the heading ‘people-to-people contacts’, the EU has included a set of priority areas in the fields of education and training, civil society, culture and public health.[55] The main activities planned for inclusion into the action plans focus on the practical benefits for the political and economic development of the partner countries that can be achieved from improved access and quality of education, training and research. Greater cooperation and interaction between the EU and the partner countries is also planned through people-to-people programs, civil society cooperation in the youth field and education exchange initiatives such as Erasmus and Tempus Mundus.[56]  

To take a practical example, the current Action Plan for Morocco incorporates a fairly long list of priorities in its ‘people-to-people contacts’ section. They vary in specificity and content and most of them set the general course while remaining open for more precise definition by the implementing authorities.[57] The overall content, however, points at an ambition to generate a lasting impact on society and politics, leading to socialization and the internalization of European norms and values. This is reflected in a number of proposed priorities such as strengthening the autonomy of universities, encouraging civil rights organizations, and ‘pursuing the implementation of new legislation on associations.’[58] Most of the other provisions under the ‘people-to-people contacts’ rubric envisage a commitment to enhanced dialogue, cooperation and strengthening cultural, civil society and education links between the EU and Morocco. There are general commitments to ‘fostering Morocco-EU cultural ties’ and supporting co-productions in the audio-visual sphere.[59] This suggests that the Union wants to avoid perceptions of the cooperation under the ENP as a form of European cultural hegemony. The process needs to have a degree of symmetry, especially in view of the fact that there is a considerable Moroccan diaspora in Europe.

The consideration of the ENP reveals that the EU’s approach to the diffusion of norms and values in its neighborhood is two-fold. On the one hand, decision-makers are targeted through rhetorical action[60] which combines ideational arguments about moral behavior with political conditionality. On the other hand, there is an effort to strengthen civil society and induce a bottom-up form of social learning. In both cases, the role of identity and culture is of particular salience. Franck Petiteville’s notion of ‘soft diplomacy’[61] accurately describes the stance taken up by the EU within the ENP framework. Reliance on long-term cultural influence is likely to bring a more deep-seated and far-reaching transformation than the more short-term political conditionality based on rewards and promises. The role of the EU’s identity, the ‘European value’ described by Smith as based on the adherence to intrinsic norms such as human rights and democracy, is therefore of central importance for the  degree of success of the ENP’s objectives.[62] It creates ‘enabling conditions’ and an ‘argumentative logic’,[63] engaging partner countries in an ongoing dialogue and interaction. The main ambiguity in interpretation would be whether the EU’s policy rests in ‘being an international identity’[64] or in using its identity as in an instrumental way in order to bring compliance. However, even if the reference to norms and values is deployed by a policy entrepreneur (the EU) acting in pursuit of its interests (stability and security in the region, trade), the identity would be strengthened if the initiatives are successful.[65]       

Conclusion

The insights from the discussion of the EU’s relationship with the Mediterranean confirm the theoretical assumptions about the importance of identity and culture for the study of European foreign policy. As evident from the main documents defining the priorities for the relationship with the partner countries, the EU’s discourse is imbued with references to norms and values, commonness and dialogue. Moreover, the specifics of the Mediterranean partnership, which includes ‘region building’ and a definition of Europe through a ‘self-other’ relationship, also calls for an interpretation informed by a focus on culture and identity. Therefore, the EU’s Mediterranean policy can be interpreted as both a general confirmation of the importance of identity for Europe’s external relations, and a specific case because of the region’s unique cultural and historic significance for the Old Continent.

 [1] Alexander Wendt, ‘Identity and Structural Change in International Politics,’ in The Return of Culture and        Identity in IR Theory, eds.  Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil (London: Boulder, 1996), 48.

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