"Had to do two hours up there," Myers said in near despair, "and listen to all that bullshit all over again. And I've got to go back up there. I'm sorry guys, but I have to go back up there again in five minutes till, and we just don't have that long here.
And another time:
Rumsfeld was intimately involved in filling the key positions on the Joint Staff. If Rumsfeld wanted someone and Myers said he couldn't live with the choice, Rumsfeld generally would drop the candidate and find someone else he wanted. But he insisted on a veto over the choice assignments. At one point, Myers wanted someone on the Joint Staff, and Rumsfeld has his own candidate. It frustrated Myers to death as they went to their separate corners and there was a little standoff. The dispute lay dormant for about three weeks. Out of the clear blue while riding the escalator up in the Pentagon one day, Rumsfeld brought it up. "If you could just give me this one, I'd appreciate it," Rumsfeld said. Myers realized he was saying "I'm not going to budge, and I'm the boss." Of course, Rumsfeld always got his way.
Woodward continues with the narrative into a key point of State of Denial about the DoD under Rumsfeld:
Myers later explained, We serve the civilian masters and the chain of command. Unless it's illegal or immoral or unethical, you do it. If you can't stand it, then you've got other options. You can retire."
First question, at what point do all the minor little actions that Rumsfeld has forced on the military add up, in their totality, to actions that are immoral and unethical? Seriously, at what point to educated men and women realize that the sum of their orders has led them down an unethical path?
And for God's sake, why haven't we seen more resignations from the generals? This will befuddle me until my dying day.




Comments: 22
Because it's fiction?
I think the first input they got, from the former chief of staff, that told them they needed a bunch more boots on the ground would have worked better, but they forced him to retire, and went in on the cheap. How do we know it would of worked better, because it did, before. His plan was the Powell Doctrine, go in with overwhelming force, etc. Nothing good seems to happen when politicians run our wars.
Have you noticed the righties who are criticizing you aren't pointing to "non-has been authors" who have written so eloquently about how we have done "mission accomplished" by bringing civil war and hundreds of thousands of deaths to Iraq?
Could it be because, well, gee willikers, THERE AREN'T ANY?
No, but I read American Soldier by General Tommy Franks.
- Is there any particular animus you have against the general who wrote that book? Is he suspect?
Don't know anything about him except he retired in 1985 and is now an armchair General for NBC.
Sean-Paul, have you read American Soldier? Is there any particular animus you have against the general who wrote that book? Is he suspect?
- other than Tommy Franks and Jerry Bremer, who can hardly be considered objective sources
Why, because General Franks was actually there?
General Franks was asked to come up with a plan, as well as lots of other Generals. His plan was shock and awe with limited troops on the ground. His reasoning was we didn't want to look like occupiers. His part worked, we went in, crushed there military in weeks. The next part was where the major screw up occurred, firing the Iraqi military.
I'm sure it was a touch decision, maybe even emotional rather then logical. Meaning how can they be trusted, where is there loyalty, to the people or to the next dictator? My opinion is if we kept the soldiers we wouldn't have needed more US troops. Since we did get rid of them we should have increased troops to fill the void. But I'm not qualified and don't have enough info for my opinion to mean anything.
You might want to broaden your horizons, instead of just reading people who you agree with.
For starters, try the Iraqi Perspectives Report, put out by the Army War College and thus an official armed forces document. It's the study the military conducted after the war based on Iraqi documents and former regime generals to find out what they did right and what they did wrong in the invasion. It's a great work of intellectual integrity, trying to discern lessons learned, instead of making excuses all the time like Franks and Bremer and others.
I have the MSM for that thank you.
- For starters, try the Iraqi Perspectives Report, put out by the Army War College and thus an official armed forces document.
I will read it, I did browse through it and I'm not sure you're talking about the right document.
This one claims the war was won before it even started.
Is this a sign that General Franks needs excuses?
Page 126
"The air attacks were the most effective message. The soldiers who did see the leaflets and then saw the air attacks knew the leaflets were true. They believed the message after that, if they were still alive. Overall they had a terrible effect on us. I started the war with 13,000 soldiers. By the time we had orders to pull back to Baghdad, I had less than 2,000; by the time we were in position inside Baghdad we had less than 1,000. Every day the desertions increased. We had no engagements with American forces. When my division pulled back across the Diyala Bridge, of the more than 500 armored vehicles assigned to me before the war, I was able to get fifty or so across the bridge. Most were destroyed or abandoned on the east side of the Diyala River."
Franks is just selling a book, based on your previous logic. So there's no reason to trust him. None at all. There are lots of contradictory claims by many people very qualified to make those claims. So, I guess everything ol' Tommy writes is just so much bunkum.
Bummer. I was really enjoying his self-serving bit about Phase IV not being his responsibility. It's obviously no one's responsibility and has never been. But that's the point. It's the Personal Responsibility Administration, I forgot.
Are we bringing this down a notch?
- Franks is just selling a book, based on your previous logic. So there's no reason to trust him. None at all.
Yes and no. He is selling a book so be skeptical. He's explaining his firsthand experience, Woodward and Trainor weren't there so how far removed were they?
- There are lots of contradictory claims by many people very qualified to make those claims.
I haven't heard any of them. Are they claiming General Franks is lying? What proof do they offer?
- Bummer. I was really enjoying his self-serving bit about Phase IV not being his responsibility.
I don't remember reading that and never heard him say it.
- It's obviously no one's responsibility and has never been. But that's the point. It's the Personal Responsibility Administration, I forgot.
I'm not sure where you read that and how reliable the source was.
I found some interesting articles about Phase IV planning.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/benson.pdf
My experience in planning Operation Iraqi Freedom
began in July 2002. while assigned to third
U.S. Army/Combined Forces Land Component
Command (CFLCC) as the C/J5, I was privileged to
direct development of the range of plans for the Land
Command from before operations began in march
2003 until I left CFLCC in July 2003. Aylwin-Foster
is wrong in claiming that we did not plan for Phase
IV. the challenge was translating the plans into
action while dealing with guidance and assumptions
from higher echelons of command, the deployment
process, and evolving policy. As a result, our plans
never quite evolved to link ground operations to
logical lines of operation that would lead to setting
solid military conditions for policy objectives.
http://www.dod.mil/policy/sections/policy_offices/isa/nesa/postwar_iraq.html
Additional organizations were created to continue in-depth planning, interagency coordination, and implementation. For example, the Joint Staff directed CENTCOM to create Joint Task Force 4 (JTF-4) in order to conduct detailed interagency planning for Phase IV stabilization operations.
The most significant outcome was a CENTCOM produced 300-page Phase IV Operations Order. It was focused on seven lines of operation: unity of effort, security, rule of law, civil administration, governance, humanitarian assistance, and resettlement.
Then there's this:
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/05winter/schnaube.htm
It explains the disconnect between all the organizations involved, civilian and military, and complications in implementing the plans.
The point is it isn't black and white, you can't just lay the blame on one or two people.
When you have more than one person responsible for something there is no accountability. When there is no accountability there is no responsibility and when there is no responsibility things don't get done. No one has been held accountable for the failure to get Phase IV operations right within the first six months. No one. By your standard that means there is no one to blame.