Follow-Up On China's Strategic Threat

Several days ago William Arkin wrote up a post at the WaPo about what we discussed last night. I find Arkin's post much better and more thought provoking than George Friedman's, mostly because I find myself being irritated with Friedman's neo-realist schtick. Don't get me wrong, Friedman is a thought provoking thinker in his own way but just not when it comes to Asia. But I digress . . .

more after the jump

Right out of the gates Arkin nails my thinking to the wall when he writes:

U.S. national security policy towards Russia, such as it exists as a separate entity from overall foreign policy objectives, is to not treat the country, despite its pseudo-democracy, it thousands of nuclear weapons and its large and capable military, as an enemy.

Why don't we treat China similarly? Is it as Arkin, asks, "[because] China is the "peer competitor" the military craves for its existence, the test case against which weapons and doctrine can be evaluated?" Or is it something deeper and darker and more systemic in the modern American psyche? Are dragons necessary for us to slay in order to justify our existence as a people? Or is it enough that we simply be . . .

Friedman writes along similar lines as Arkin:

The United States is now back to where it was before the 9/11 attacks. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld came into office with two views. The first was that China was the major challenge to the United States. The second was that the development of high-tech weaponry was essential to the United States. With this report, the opening views of the administration are turning into the closing views. China is again emerging as the primary challenge; the only solution to the Chinese challenge is in technology.

I prefer the formulation that China is not a challenge to American interests, but that its reintegration into the international system, from which it has been largely absent since the early 1700s, is the primary challenge for the United States and the rest of the developed world.

If China's reintegration is managed well there will be peace. So let's ask the kind of questions Arkin encourages us to: Under what circumstances would we risk WWIII to defend Taiwan? Let's also be clear where our interests lie and where those of the Chinese lay as well.

Let's look for a potential partner in the Chinese government, not an enemy. And when our interests collide let's already have created a framework based on past confidence building measures so that when we do negotiate or stumble into a crisis we begin from a place of good faith.

However, if China's reintegration is to be seen as a threat to America (and the developed world) then there will not be peace. And nothing good will come out of a hot or a cold war with China.

Both Arkin and Friedman concur as to what the consequences of the Pentagon's current strategery are likely to be.

Arkin muses that, "Surely by assuming eventual war with China we are also making it a tiny bit more likely."

Friedman is more, well, algebraic:

Each side is defensive at the moment. Each side sees a long-term possibility of a threat. Each side is moving to deflect that threat. This is the moment at which conflicts are incubated.

China won't fight the kind of war we want them too, a war to be avoided as well. So why not try something different for once?