The countries of the Middle East have often been separated by comparing what characterizes it from its fellow neighbors. This began after World War I through the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which carved up the Levant into separate political entities. For instance, wealthy tribal royals were given control over a designated region, such as with King Faisal ibn Hussein in Iraq and King Abdul Aziz al-Saud in Saudi Arabia. In the case of Iran, its country had a government whose appointed leader, Reza Shah, remained loyal to Western influence. As national identity developed, it increasingly became tied with the identity of the population who sought religious authority as its preferred form of government. Eventually what separated each country from another was not whether its government was a secular regime or a traditionalist monarchy, but under which sect of Islam its population practiced and was governed. Significant events, such as the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, solidified this transition and divided the countries of the Middle East into strictly Sunni (Saudi Arabia) or Shiite (Iran) states.
The majority of Shiite Muslims in the world has resided in Iran. Under the corrupt leadership of Reza Shah, the population longed for a solution, possibly a savior, to end their continued oppression. While the Shah enjoyed the wealth gained from the commercial alliances for Iran's oil resource, Iran's citizens remained in the underclass. Growing resentment towards the self-indulgent elite was felt by both the population and the clergy who opposed the Shah's instigation of Western reforms and the use of his SAVAK secret police to control the country (Mansfield 327). Tensions grew between religious and political leaderships because the Ulema felt that all political power was illegitimate as the only real power lies with the hidden Imam. Until he reappeared, it was said that the ruler of the community should be the smartest of the Ulema, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (Mansfield 327). When Khomeini returned from exile in February 1979, he called for a "revolt of the oppressed and the faithful against privilege" (Ajami 133). Khomeini helped overthrow the Shah's regime in favor of a government based on (Shiite) Islamic law. The citizens rejoiced as the "revolutionary state promised utopia, a revenge against the mighty and the pampered, a social order more pure and authentic" (Ajami 147). Khomeini reigned as the supreme leader and reinstated the religious authority that the Shah had taken from the Ulema. He was believed to be, by the Shiite majority, the chosen 12<sup>th</sup> Imam descended from Ali and the guardian of Islam.
For its neighbor to the West, the revolution in Iran caused Saddam Hussein fear of a similar uprising occurring with Iraq's Shiite majority. To inhibit this from happening, Saddam launched war against Iran on September 1980 under the pretense of an assassination attempt of Iraq's Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz (Mansfield 330). Through the camaraderie of his Sunni allies, Saddam received financial support from the wealthier Gulf countries that relied on Saddam to fight the war that defended traditional Islamic order. "The work of defending the familiar order of things, of preempting the potential rebellion of the Shia stepchildren in the Arab world, fell to Saddam Hussein (Ajami 138). The fight for domination of the Persian Gulf and its resources lasted eight violent years with hundreds of thousands of lives lost and billions of dollars in damages done to both countries. In the end, a UN-sponsored ceasefire was mandated, but peace-talks were unsuccessful. To the majority of (Sunni) Muslims, the war had deepened the great divide between the two Islamic sects. Iran became the homeland for the followers of the Prophet Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, while Saudi Arabia remained the birthplace of the Prophet and of the religion itself.
The monarchs of Saudi Arabia, King Khalid, and currently King Fahd, learned great lessons from the revolution in Iran. By exhibiting less of royal wealth and supporting the religious authority of the clergy, Saudis prevented an uprising of the country's lower class citizens (Ajami 147-148). While the Shia minority in the country was too small to inflict any significant rebellion, the majority of the Kingdom's (Sunni Muslim) population generally accepted the monarchy for its support of its protected orthodox clergy.
The Saudi realm rested on a partnership: the dynasty has enjoyed an unquestioned monopoly in matters of 'high policy,' such as defense, oil, finance, and foreign affairs. But the religious functionaries have always had their prerogatives- and their compensation (Ajami 148).
Ultimately, there was little defiance towards monarchy because the government rule was imposed by the clergy and Shariah Islamic law. Any opposition to the clergy would in turn be an opposition towards the Quran, the living word of God.
Although, it is interesting to note that the debate between the sects occurred after the death of the Prophet Muhammad as the Quran makes no mention of either sect, Sunni or Shiite. Populations of both Sunni and Shiite sects have experienced similar transitions in countries whose administration eventually relied more heavily on religious authority. The desire for religious authority marked a change in the way people viewed their government. This desire was caused either by threats to traditional Islam and/or the need for equalization and redemption.
Sources
Ajami, Fouad. The Dream Palace of the Arabs: A Generation's Odyssey. New York, 1998.
Mansfield, Peter. A History of the Middle East. London, 1991.
The Middle East and Islamic World Reader. New York, 2003.


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